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AN EXAMINATION OF SANDERSON v. PENNSYLVANIA
COAL COMPANY'
THE FACTS

The facts of this important case, were presented by Woodward, J., when it first appeared in the Supreme Court. In the
year 1868, Mrs. Sanderson bought a tract of land in the city of
Scranton, and began the erection of a house upon it which was
finished in 1870. Before the purchase, a stream which ran
through the tract, was examined and traced to its source by Mr.
Sanderson. The existence of this stream was a leading inducement to buy and build. The brook had an average width of
seven feet. The water was perfectly pure. Dams were built
across it for a fish and ice pond, and to supply a cistern. Water
was carried in pipes from the cistern to a ram, and thence to a
tank in the attic of the house. After the improvements were
completed, the defendants established a colliery, near the stream,
about two miles above the Sanderson land. A drift was first
made. A shaft was afterwards sunk. The water from the drift
ran spontaneously out upon defendant's land, to the brook. The
water of the shaft was pumped up, and likewise ran into the
brook. The mine water thus introduced into the stream, corrupted it and made its water unusable. The attempt to use it
was abandoned by Mrs. Sanderson in 1875. An action for damages was then brought by her.
THE FIRST TRIAL

The trial judge, Stanton, J., entered a compulsory non-suit
on the ground (a) there was shown neither malice nor negligence,
on the part of the Coal Company, (b) the corruption of the water
of Meadow creek was the unavoidable consequence of the mining
operations.
1113 Pa., 126.
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THE FIRST APPEAL-OPINION OF WOODWARD, 3.
The Supreme Court, one judge, Paxson, J., dissenting, reversed the non-suit, and awarded a procedendo. A brief syllabus
of the opinion of Woodward, J., who spoke for the court is here
given. (1) While the water had been in the defendant's land
before the colliery existed, the drift and shaft collected it in such
volume, and the mining operations made its ejection necessary in
such a direction as to render it, previously harmless, a source of
mischief. (2) The lawfulness of the business, viz. mining, the
fact that a like business engages the capital and labor of many
persons, does not delete the wrong. However laudable an industry, its managers are still subject to the rule that their property cannot be so used as to injure the property of their neighbor.
(3) The absence of a malevolent intention to injure, does not justify the injurious act. (4) With exceptions, the duty of the
owner of property is defined by the maxim sie utere two ut
alienum non laedas. (5) The trial court could not say, as a conclusion of law, that the defendant is within any exceptions. (6)
It is said that in more than a thousand collieries producing annually 20,000,000 of tons in the anthracite regions of the State, the
mining of coal can be carried on only by pumping out the percolating water, which, when brought to the surface, must find
its way by a naturalflow, to some surface stream. But this consideration justifies only the insistence that the plaintiff should have
suffered some "material and appreciable injury." The plaintiff
must endure without redress "trifling and small inconveniences,"
but not injuries which sensibly diminish the comfort, enjoyment
or value of the property affected. (7) The consequences of the
adoption of the doctrine that even serious losses should be borne
by the plaintiff if they are incident to the prosecution of a business by the defendant, which is like that prosecuted by a good
many other persons in the State, and the prosecution of which
is of great importance to the State, e. g. anthracite mining,
would be depreciable. "One invasion of individual right would
follow another, and it might be only a question of time when,
under the operations of even a single colliery, a whole country
side would be depopulated. Six of the seven judges of the Su2
preme Court agreed with the doctrine of this opinion.
2
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DISSENTING OPINION OF PAXSON, J.
The dissenting opinion of Paxson, J.,8 may be thus summarized. (1) No riparian owner has complained heretofore, during
the half century of mining operations, although there is hardly
a mountain stream in the mining region that is not affected as is
Meadow creek. (2) Pennsylvania cases relied upon, Howell v.
McCoy, 3 R. 256; Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298; McCallam
v. Water Co., 54 Pa. 40, are not apposite because in each of them
injurious foreign substances had been artificially introduced into
the water. (3) The only English case, Pennington v. Brinksop
Hall Coal Co., which seemingly sustains the doctrine of the majority, is, as being English, of no authority here. It is the opinion of but one judge. In England, the country was occupied for
centuries before coal mining began. In Pennsylvania, the country was a wilderness, when mining operations commenced. (4)
The plaintiff has enjoyed the advantages which coal mining
confers. There is then, no great hardship, in compelling her to
accept the inconvenience resulting from the business. (5) The
defendant did nothing to foul the water, which flowed from its
mine into Meadow creek. (6)Some of this water flowed naturally into the creek; some was pumped out, but this was after the
injury complained of had been done. (7) Defendant had a
right to mine the coal, and, therefore, to free its mine from
water, even by pumping if necessary. (8) Had defendant fouled
the water which is discharged from its mine, it would be liable,
but it has not. It has a right to let the water run into the
streams. (9) If plaintiffs have a right to damages, they have a
right to an injunction to prevent future pumping or permitting
the flow of water. "(10) The defendant could not be allowed
to carry the water to the Lackawanna or some other stream,
if it may not carry it to Meadow creek. (11) If an injunction
against future mining should not be granted, the same result
would be obtained if a judgment were entered in this case for the
plaintiff, for even if the first verdict should be for a nominal sum
the second and subsequent verdicts would empty the cash box of
the coal company, and make mining impossible. (12) If the
plaintiff may recover, all other property owners who are hurt by
SPrinted in 113 Pa. St.. at page 156.

4

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

the pollution of streams from mining, may also recover. Mining in the future could not be carried on, except with the consent of the riparian owners. (13) The law regards some damna
as being absque injuria. This damnum must be so regarded,
although it is difficult to define the damna that shall be considered
cur injuria, and those that shall be considered absque injuria.
(14) The "trifling" inconvenience to particular persons must
sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community.
SECOND TRIAL
The non-suit having been reversed by the Supreme Court,
a second trial was had which resulted in a verdict of $250 for the
plaintiff. With the judgment entered upon this verdict, both
parties being dissatisfied, they severally appealed. Upon the
appeal of the plaintiff, for errors which resulted in undue restrictions of the damages recovered, thejudgmentwas reversed, in
Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Company, 102 Pa. 370. Upon
the appeal of the company, the judgment was affirmed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 94 Pa. 302, Gordon, J., writing
the opinion. Paxson, J. and Sterrett, J. dissented. This decision was therefore that of five of the seven judges of the court.
OPINION OF GORDON, J.
The points made by Gordon, J., are (1) Mrs. Sanderson's
right to have and use the waters of Meadow Brook, "pure and
valuable for domestic purposes," is undoubted. (2) If the defendant is the cause of the injury, it should pay damages. The
argument is fallacious, that the right of the plaintiff must yield,
because the pollution of the brook results from coal mining and
coal mining is "important to the welfare of this commonwealth."
The defendant's operations are conducted purely for the purpose
of private gain. Any lawful industry results in the general good.
None, however important, can justly claim the right to take and
use property of citizens without compensation. (3) The argument based on the alleged custom with respect to disposing of
water pumped from mines in the Lackawanna and Wyoming
coal regions is unconvincing. (a) As a local custom, it would
be insufficient, because the defendant's colliery is the only one
within the territory drained by Meadow Brook, and the pollution
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of its water has occurred since the plaintiff purchased her property. (b) As a general custom, it lacks the necessary age, for
the beginning of deep coal mining is within the memory of men
yet living. Besides a custom to deprive one of his property for
the advancement of the interests of the defendant corporation,
is unreasonable and unlawful. (4) Though it is true that mining
cannot be carried on without the outflow of acidulous water, and
the necessarily consequent pollution of streams, it is also true
that there could not be mining without roads, on xvhich to transport the coal after it was mined. The mine owner cannot take
the land of others without compensation for roads, nor can he
the streams. (5) The 8th sect. of the 14th article of the Constitution requires that private property shall not be taken for a public use without compensation. A fortiori if it could be taken
for a private use, at all, it could not be so taken, without compensation.
THIRD TRIAL

The judgment for $250 in favor of Mrs. Sanderson having
been on her writ of error, reversed, and a new trial awarded in
order that she might have an opportunity to obtain larger damages, the case was again tried, and it resulted in a verdict for
$2872.74. The defendant then appealed intending to raise again
the question of liability which had been twice determined by the
Supreme Court against it. The reason for hoping for a different
decision was the change in the composition of the court. Of the
judges who united in the first decision, Agnew, Sharswood,
Woodward, had ceased to be members of the court. Green and
Clark had become members. Paxson, Sterrett, Green and Clark
united in the opinion of the court, while Mercur, Gordon and
Trunkey dissented. The opinion for the majority was written
by Clark, J. This opinion we shall now examine.
OPINION OF CLARK, J.

(1) The action is for damages, But, if they are recovered,
in a second action punitive damages might be recovered. A
court of equity, too, would, after a recovery at law, enjoin against
the continued pollution of the stream. But, the case of the defendant is that of all other coal mine operators. Hence mining
could not be conducted, except with the general consent of all
parties affected.
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The naivet& of this suggestion is interesting. When A proposes to develop his own property in a mode in which it cannot be
developed, without affecting the property of others, why should
he not obtain their consent?
Why is A to enrich himself
by impoverishing B or C, or D? The coal in tract m is A's.
It cannot be taken out by A, without using a road, as Gordon, J.
suggested, over B's land or without destroying B's water supply.
But B may withhold his consent to the use of the road, or of
the water. Therefore, A must have the right to use it without
B's consent !
Clark, J. refers to the number of persons engaged in the
business of mining coal and the amount of coal annually mined
in Pennsylvania. There are, he said, in 1886, 30,000,000 tons of
anthracite, and 70,000,000 tons of bituminous coal produced
yearly in the State. But, if this production would not sell for
enough to pay for the expense of producing it, including a fair
profit on the capital invested, would it be profitable to the miner
or even to the State, to continue the business? Would the mine
owner continue it, if it did not pay him? If he cannot carry it
on without destroying streams of water, for which he would have
had use, would he not expect to be reimbursed from the business
as much for the destruction of the stream, as for the machinery
and the land, which are consumed? And if he would expect
reimbursement from the business, for the loss of the money and
other property which he expended in it, belonging to himself,
why should he not expect to reimburse himself for the losses
which the business occasioned to others and which he should
make good?
Mrs. Sanderson was made an unwilling partner in the business. Why was she not at least compensated for the value of
her property that was taken without her consent,
It is surely not to the interest of the State to promote a vast
aggregate of businesses which are not profitable enough to replace the losses of property consumed therein.
Many of the coal companies are making 10, 15, 20 per cent.
upon the capital invested. Why should not those who suffer
losses from their operations be requited, even if the result would
be to reduce the dividend from 10 to 9, or from 20 to 18 per cent?
But should the companies be compelled to pay those whose
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property they have destroyed, they would not pay a whit less
dividends than they now pay. They would simply increase the
price of the coal. They have increased the price of coal, by the
amount of the tax lately imposed on coal by the State of Pennsylvania, thus casting from themselves upon the consumer, the
burden. They would do the same, were the courts to hold that
they must reimburse those whose property, without the owners'
consent, they take, in the prosecution of their business.
It is too plain to be contested, that a business ought to be
profitable enough to reimburse those whose capital is invested
in it, and especially those if any, whose property is, despite themselves taken or destroyed. But, Clark, J., argues, as did Paxson, J., in his dissenting opinion, that, if actual damages are permitted to be recovered once, punitive damages would be recovered
subsequently, damages so heavy as to prohibit the continuance
of the business. Nay, a court of equity they say would after
the first judgment at law, enjoin against the further pollution of
the streams, and that would virtually be to enjoin against the
continuance of the mining itself. But, who made the principle
that in a second action for injury to property, the damages
might be vindictive? Surely the courts, and if they made the
principle, they have, it is to be hoped, not lost the power to qualify it, to make exceptions to it, to determine e. g. that when the
injury is caused without malice, or negligence in the prosecution
of a work that ought to be carried on, only compensatory damages shall, however frequent the action, be recoverable.
In cases in which property, has been injured, by a little ingenuity a succession of actions has been avoided by allowing
4
the jury to find that the damage is permanent and by awarding
compensation as for a permanent injury in the first suit. The
court could easily have said, the mining is virtually permanent;
the pollution of the water is virtually permanent. Therefore in
one action, the damages assessable shall be compensation for the
injuries that would be inflicted by the continuous and permanent
pollution of the stream. There is a painful suggestion of imbecillity when a court refuses to compel compensation for a plain
injury, on the pretext that under a rule of procedure, which its
4Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493; Carpenter v. Lancaster, 212 Pa., 581;
'hompson v. Traction Co., 181 Pa., 131; William v. Fulmer, 151 Pa., 405.
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own will has brought into existence, or is perpetuating, the result of giving compensation in one case would be a prohibitive
punition in a later case of the continuance of the injury. If the
act which causes the injury is praiseworthy, why should it be
prohibited, even if it inflicts damage? Why should the court
not content itself with giving actual compensation, and no "more,
as often as loss is inflicted? The courts are already distinguishing between pollution of streams caused -by the business of mining, and pollution caused by other businesses but instead of distinguishing in order to make those who prosecute the former,
liable but once and for permanent damages, they have without
reason, chosen to distinguish in order to hold them liable for
no damage at all. Because the judges are unwilling to say that
mine operators shall not be so far burdened with damages as to
be disabled from mining altogether, they take the absurd position
that the operators shall not be liable at all, helplessly declaring
that there is no middle ground between total prohibition by
punitive damages, or injunction and total immunity from liability towards those whom they injure, if the injury is unavoidable without ceasing to mine altogether.
The reference to the amount of coal extracted from the lands
of Pennsylvania, made both by Paxson, J. and by Clark, J. reposes on the assumption that, if many people are -engaged in
many business enterprises of the same sort, enterprises by which
wealth is produced in large measures for those who are engaged
therein, those thus engaged may not only impose servitudes upon
the property of others, but impose them without compensation.
If only one, two, six or ten persons in the State had coal land and
engaged in the business of extracting it, they severally would
not be allowed to take, especially without compensation, the property of others, in order to make their business the more remunerative to them. Multiply the number of miners however by
100 or 1000. Then, each of these hundred or thousand miners
acquires a right to forcibly expropriate his neighbor of some
of his property. In some way, the "public" becomes interested
in the business. Each miner is in a sense subrogated to the
rights of this "public." This public has the right to be furnished
with coal, or with the wealth that coal produces, at the expense
of the riparian neighbors of the miner. Therefore each miner
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has this right. In a learned opinion of Judge Endlich,5 by
which he justifies the enjoining of a fertilizer companyfrommaking fertilizers out of dead animals and butchers' refuse, he remarks, "I have not been able to find a case in which substantial
injuries to property rights, to the rights of enjoying and possessing property, have been sanctioned by a final refusal to enjoin,
on the mere ground that the public was interested in their continuance." He quotes from Broadbent v. Gas Co., 7 DeGex, M.
& G., 436, where it was argued for the company that the injury
inflicted on the plaintiff's property was slight in comparison with
the manifest benefits conferred by the company on the public,
and therefore, the court ought not to enjoin the manufacture of
gas. Lord Cranworth, the Chancellor, said "I have come to the
conclusion that I cannot enter into any question of how far it
might be convenient for the public that the gas manufacture
should go on" and he added that to deny an injunction upon such
a ground, and oblige the plaintiff to depend on a series of actions
for damages "would be a disgraceful state of the law." Our
own Gordon, J., has said 6 "A person cannot claim immunity on
the ground that * * * the trade is a useful one and beneficial
to the community, or to the nation, or that by bringing a large
number of workmen into the community, it has enhanced the
value of the plaintiff's property." If A, in developing his land
has no right to injure his neighbor without compensation, how
can he acquire that right, because B, and C, and D, and E, etc.
severally in developing their lands, in a similar way, are inflicting
similar injuries upon their respective neighbors?
(2) The mining was done by means of a drift of the deeper
,strata, by means of a shaft. The water poured from the drift
upon the adjacent land and ran thereover down to Meadow
Brook. The water that collected in the shaft, was pumped up
to the surface of the land and then poured thereupon, thus flowing to the brook. Clark, J., holds that both modes of introducing the water to the creek were justifiable. The making of a
shaft was as proper and necessary, as the making of a drift.
The ridding of the shaft of the water by pumping was as neces5
6

REvans v. Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa., 209.
Pa. Lead Co.'s Appeal, 96 Pa., 116.
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sary as the ridding of the drift by the unassisted force of gravitation. Hence he concludes, the corruption of the water by both
modes, was equally convenient, equally exempt from civil re7
sponsibility.
Thinking however, that there might be a difference as to
justifiableness, between the two modes, Clark, J., remarks that
the evidence in the case did not permit of the ascertainment of
the quantity of pollution and damage, from the water that flowed
from the drift, and of the quantity of pollution and damage from
the water that came by pumping from the shaft. "The witnesses
did not discriminate in their testimony, and the learned court did
not instruct the jury to make any discrimination." The court
tacitly assumes that if a man may without liability corrupt a
stream so as to make its water unusable, by doing certain acts,
his further corruption of it, by doing acts which he would have
no right to do, will not be actionable, will be "an injury without
damage." "The pollution of a clear stream might inflict an injury for which damages would be recoverable, but we cannot see
how damages could be estimated for the pollution of a stream
which had already become foul from other causes, for which the
law gave no remedy."
The evidence was not distinct that the drift water had spoiled
the brook before the shaft water had begun to be pumped up.
That it had was tacitly assumed, for the court has hardly committed itself to the proposition that if two acts, one legitimate,
the other illegitimate are done simultaneously, and simultaneously corrupt the water, there can be no recovery for the corruption flowing from the illegitimate acts.
(3) That there can be no mining without freeing the drifts
and shafts of water, was probably proved to the satisfaction of
the court, or was taken notice of without proof. This water
would necessarily go somewhere. But, would it necessarilkr go
into Meadow creek? At the hearing of the first case in the
Supreme Court, it was argued" that the water might have been
7113 Pa., 147, 148.
8113 Pa., 161.
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carried into the Lackawanna or some other stream, by a tunnel.
At the hearing of the last case 9 it was suggested by Clark, J.,
that the coal company, which had created an "artificial watercourse" upon its land from the mine openings to Meadow creek,
could not have conducted the water to some other point of safety.
"Where" he asks triumphantly, "where, short of the sea, might
the sewer be discharged, that the same complaint might not be
made." But is it an ascertained fact, that if water is conducted
from a point it must be conducted to the sea? Are sewage
disposal plants seas? Was it self-evident that pits or receptacles, wide and deep enough to hold the water from the
mine, could not have been dug by the defendant? If they could
have been, why was it not the duty of the defendant, not to stop
mining, but to conduct the water from the mine, which the process liberated, to such receptacles?
Upon this subject the following principles have been elaborated since the decision in 113 Pa. 161. (a) The burden is upon
the defendant to show that no device was practicable, by which

the injury could have been averted, consistently with the prose10
cution of the mining.
(b) The unavoidableness of the injury might result from the
physical impossibility of employing any device, by which it could
be prosecuted, or the excessive expense of such device as would
be adequate. The absolute magnitude of the cost is not to be
considered, but the ratio of the cost to the profitableness of the
business. "If" says Mitchell, J., "the expense of preventing the
damage from his act is such as practically to counterbalance
the expected profit or benefit, then it is clearly unreasonable, and
beyond what he could justly be called upon to assume. If, on
the other hand however large in amount, it is small in proportion
to the gain to himself, it is reasonable, in regard to his neighbor's
rights,and he should pay it, to prevent the damage, or should
make compensation for the injury done." The defendant is excused from incurring expense in devising ways of averting damage, only when "the expense required would so detract from the
9113 Pa., 148, 149.
' 0Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa., 267; McCune v. Pittsburg, etc. C. Co.,
235 Pa., 83.
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purpose and benefit of the contemplated act [e. g. the business of
mining coal] as to be a substantial deprivation of the right to the
use of one's own property."'"
So far as the reports disclose, no effort was made by the
coal company to show that no method of disposing of the acidulous water of the mine, other than allowing it to run into the
brook, was practicable. It was not shown that the making of
artificial receptacles for it was physically impossible; nor that
the expense of making them, if possible, would be excessive, in
relation to the profitableness of the business of the defendants.
Would the outlay have reduced the annual dividend from 25 per
cent. to 24? The court simply assumes without evidence, that
the only alternative for the defendant was to refrain from mining
altogether, or to ruin the brook for all riparian owners, and
without compensation to them! Clark, J., states 12 the principle
of the decision in such form as to eliminate altogether the consideration of avoidableness of the injury. "We do say that in
the operation of mining, in the ordinary and usual manner he
[a miner] may, upon his own lands, lead the water which percolates into his mine, into the streams which form the natural drainage of the basin, in which the coal is situate, although the quantity as well as the quality of the water in the stream, may thereby
be affected." No duty to lead the water elsewhere, if it can be
led at an expense not prohibitive, no duty to justify the pollution
of the stream, by showing the unavoidableness of it, is imputed
to the miner.
(4) Difficult it is to know exactly what the principle was,
which the writer of the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson postulates. On page 149, we observe the statement "To
encourage the development of the great natural resources of a
country, trifling inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community." But, did
the plaintiff suffer only a "trifling inconvenience?" The jury
admeasured it by $2872.74. The "inconvenience" to Mrs. San11Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa., 267; Collins v. Chartiers V. Gas Co.,
131 Pa., 143; McCune v. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 238 Pa., 83; Com. v. Russell.
172 Pa., 506, 521.
12113 Pa., 149.
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derson was suffered, not to satisfy two or more "necessities" of
a "great community" but the desire of the stockholders of the
Pennsylvania Coal Company to make 25 per cent. dividends upon
their invested capital. The "great community," if that be Pennsylvania, does not require or desire that it should be served or
otherwise enriched with coal, which has been mined in part at
the expense of Mrs. Sanderson, without any portion of the money
for which the coal is sold, going to her.
(5) Woodward, J., in 86 Pa. 401, disapproving of the nonsuit which was entered by the trial court, cited a few cases, one of
which was Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R., 1 Ex. 280, the doctrine
from which was stated to be that if A brings something on his
land which be it animate or inanimate, may escape, and get upon
his neighbor's land, he is bound, apart from any negligence, to
make good the damages which ensues, should it escape. This
leads Clark, J., in four pages, to show, first that the doctrine
of Fletcher v. Rylands is not sound, and has been repudiated by
a few English and many American decisions, and secondly, that
even if sound, it has no relevancy to the case before the court,
because the water which escaped from the defendant's land had
been put there, not by the defendant, but by the force of gravity.
But, what have we learned, when we learn that cases are sometimes cited by eminent judges which have no relevancy to the
facts? How is it edifying for one justice of the Supreme Court
to compel us to see and to admit that another justice of the same
court did not know, when he was talking so learnedly, what he
was talking about?
It really cannot matter whether Fletcher v. Rylands was decided rightly or not. The question before the court was whether
it was the duty of. the defendant to abstain from mining altogether, if it could not avoid the destruction of the purity of the
brook, to Mrs. Sanderson's material, (not "trifling") injury, or to
make her a fair compensation.
With equal superciliousness, Clark, J. brushes aside Pennington v. Brinksop Hall Coal Co., 5 Ch. Div., 769, which had
been cited by Woodward, J., in 86 Pa., 401, and of which that
justice had said it "was decided so lately as last May, and it
would seem that in England this branch of the law has been definitely and. firmly settled." Clark, J., scornfully casts it out,
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by the remark, "As the question now under consideration was
neither discussed nor decided we cannot see how the case can
be supposed [by Woodward, J., for example] to have any importance here."
(6) Clark, J., concedes, 113 Pa. p. 155, that a stream of water
may not be fouled by the introduction into it of any foreign substance, to the damage and injury of the lower riparian owners.
This principle however he remarks is without pertinence because
the defendant introduced nothing into the water; the water flowed
into Meadow Brook just as it was found in the mine; its impurities were from natural and not from artificial causes. The water
that got into the mine, would have remained there but for the
opening of the drift and the pumping from the shaft. There
may be minds that see a vast difference between voluntary acidulation of the water and voluntary allowance of its escape by artificial means and "natural" acidulation, followed by voluntary
allowance of its escape. Both acts are equally disastrous in result. Why there should be responsibility for the effects of one,
and not of the other, is not so evident as to be unworthy of
explication.
(7) The opinion of Clark, J., concludes with a suggestion
from the dissenting opinion of Paxson, J. The population,
wealth and improvements in the coal country are the result of
mining alone. The plaintiff knew this, when she bought her
land. There is no great hardhsip, therefore, in compelling her to
suffer a loss of $2872.74, in order to maintain the high dividends
paid from year to year by the Coal Company. Mrs. Sanderson
before she bought her land and expended moneys in improving
it, knew that the Meadow Brook's water was pure. She had reason to believe that upper riparian owners, by the law of Pennsylvania, were obliged to refrain from corrupting or polluting the
waters of such a stream. When the question was presented by
her to the Supreme Court, it declared, in 1878 that her apprehension of the law was correct. It renewed the declaration in
1880, and again in 1883. In 1886 she was stunned with the announcement that she had been wrong, the Supreme Court had
been three times wrong and that she must not only suffer the loss
of $2872.74, inflicted upon her by the defendant in the selfish pursuit of its own self-enrichment, but the additional loss involved
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in the costs, and the attorneys' fees. This was the result of the
invention by the court in 1886, of the principle that a man may
develop his land, by a so-called natural use, e. g. may extract its
stone, sand, coal, petroleum, although, in so doing, he causes the
water in the streams to become unfit for use.
FUTURE REFERENCE TO THE CASE
A number of cases refer to the decision in 113 Pa. 126. Some
of them state the doctrine believed to be taught by it, without
criticism. Endlich, J., thought it was that the "natural" use
of one's land, without negligence or malice, casts no liability for
8
rell, J.
any loss that unavoidably follows to one's neighbor.'
thought it was that when the defendant did not change the character of the water save by making a natural use of his land,.when
he brought nothing on the land artificially, when the water which
corrupts the stream is the water which the mine "naturally"
discharges, and the impurities of this corrupting water arise from
14
natural and not artificial causes, there is no liability. Williams,
J. cites the decision in 113 Pa., 126, for the principle that the
miner may mine in a proper manner, and he will not be liable
merely because the drainage from the mines falls into and pol15
Paxlutes a stream, and thus injures lower riparian owners.
son, J., the father of the Sanderson doctrine, thus explains it.
The injuries complained of were the natural and necessary result of the development by the owner, of the resources of his
own land. The flow of mine water was the natural and necessary
result of the mining.1 0 Paxson, J. again cites 113 Pa., 126, but
merely as an illustration of the generalization that "mining
rights are peculiar and exist from necessity, and the necessity
must be recognized, and the rights of mine and land owners adjusted and protected accordingly"' 17 an illuminating statement
surely. Williams, J. explains' 8 the Sanderson case thus: Coal
13Evans v. Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa., 209;
1 4 Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa., 493.
15 Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 157 Pa., 490.
16Hauck v. Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa., 366.
' 7 Chartier's Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa., 286.
1sRobb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa., 324.
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land can be utilized only by bringing the coal to the surface.
Subterranean veins of water are necessarily opened. The accumulating water must be brought to the surface. It then
naturally finds its way to the streams and pollutes them. If this
could not be done [legally] a great industry would be interfered
with, the owner of the coal land denied the exercise of the rights
of ownership, for the benefit of a lower riparian owner, whose
title is no higher than his own. The maxim sic 2tere tuo, etc.
was hence neither suspended nor modified in the Sanderson case.
The harm done to Mrs. Sanderson was the least in amount consistent with the natural and lawful use of the coal land. So,
speaks Williams, J. But, if Mrs. Sanderson's right was, to have
the water uncorrupted by any upper riparianowner, the maxim sic
atere tuo was plainly suspended or modified. What the Sanderson decision does, is to deny the existence of a right in the
lower riparian owner to have the water uncontaminated. His
right merely is, to have it exempt from contamination, unless
that contamination is an unavoidable result of coal mining operations. Indeed, Williams, J., says plumply, quoting 113 Pa., 132,
in support, "If in raising the mine water to the surface, for purposes of drainage, a surface stream is [unavoidably] corrupted
and rendered unfit for use, those affected thereby cannot recover
0
9
In Robertson v. Coal Co.,2
damages," i. e., suffer no wrong.'
Williams, J. refers to the Sanderson case, simply to say that it
does not qualify the rule that a sale of all the coal in a tract is
not, by implication a release to the vendee, of the right to sur2
face support. Remarks by the same judge ' upon the Sanderson
case intimate that a borough or city, furnished with water from
a stream, or the water company that furnished it might enjoin
against the pollution of it by salt water drawn up to the surface,
in pumping for coal oil, but his remarks leave uncertain whether
the right to an injunction would not depend on proof that the
oil operation could be so conducted, at a reasonable expense, as
to avoid the pollution of the water at that part of the stream from
which the borough's water supply was obtained. Clark, J., in
' 9 Collins v. Chartier's V. Gas Co., 139 Pa., 111.
20172 Pa., 566.
21
Com. v. Russell, 172 Pa., 506.
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Del. & H. Canal Co. v. Goldstein, 22 adverts to the Sanderson
case, as sustaining the principle that a canal company would not
be liable for leakage from its canal basin into the plaintiff's
premises, in the absence of malice or negligence. Paxson, J., in
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Merchant 2 3 quotes from 113 Pa., 126, the
doctrine that every man has a right to the natural use of his property, and is not liable for loss to his neighbors, arising without
negligence or malice, from this use, "for the rightful use of one's
land may cause damage to another, without any legal wrong."
A bill being filed to restrain the defendants from using a gas
pump in an oil well, the result of such use being the reduction
of the supply of gas in the plaintiff's well, the court dismissing
the bill, quoted from the Sanderson case that every man may
make the ordinary and natural use of his property, may cut down
forest trees, clear and cultivate his land, although in so doing,
he dries up his neighbor's springs, or removes natural barriers
against wind and storm. In sinking his well, he may intercept
and appropriate the water which supplies his neighbor's well. 24
The Sanderson case is described by Green, J., as the mere flowage
of natural water which was discharged by natural and irresistible
forces, necessarily developed in the act of mining prosecuted in
a perfectly lawful manner. The mine water, it was observed,
caused no deposit [of culm, as in the case before the court] of any
foreign substance on the plaintiff's land, and did not deprive her
of its use.2 5 In Strauss v. Allentown 6 Mitchell, C. J., laid down
the principle that "Every man has the right to the natural, proper
and profitable use of his own land, and if in the course of such
use, without negligence, unavoidable loss is brought upon his
neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria. This is the universal rule
of the common law, and nowhere is it more strictly enforced than
in Pennsylvania. After elaborate and repeated argument, and
the most mature consideration, it was applied to a case admittedly of great hardship, difficulty and doubt, involving a serious
choice of evils, in Pennslyvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa.,
22125 Pa., 246.
23119 Pa., 541.
24
jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa., 379.
25Hindson v. Markle, 171 Pa.. 138.
26215 Pa., 96.
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126." But, the writei of the opinion in the Sanderson case did
not think he was making a "serious choice of evils," if that
means, a choice between serious evils; serious evils to the coal
company, if it was to be impeded in its mining operations; and
serious evil to Mrs. Sanderson, if her pure water supply by means
of the brook was- to -be destroyed. Clark, J., said "trifling inconveniences 127 must sometimes be borne by individuals, in
subordination to the necessities of a great community. The
corollary that Mitchell, C. J., derived from the principle was,
that the city of Allentown could grade streets with impunity,
notwithstanding that the effect was to back water into a tailrace, and so greatly to decrease the value of the mill. In Commonwealth v. Emmers, 28 a prosecution for allowing sewage
from water closets to pass into the Schuylkill river, the Sanderson case is quoted as supporting the principle, "when, in the development of the natural resources of the land, the water from a
mine must necessarily and unavoidably pass into a stream, and
that consequence could only be avoided by an expenditure which
would amount to a practical prohibition of the development of
the land, [and how would it be true that the water 'must
necessarily and unavoidably pass,' etc., if its passing could be
avoided by any expenditure whatever] the injury to a lower
riparian owner resulting from such unavoidable mixture of the
water of the mine with that of the stream, is a private injury for
which there is no remedy." But, the Sanderson opinions say
nothing about expenditures. In Bricker v. Conemaugh Stone
Coal Co., 2 9 where the cause of action was the deposit of sand in
a stream to the injury of a grist-mill, the court denied the applicability of the Sanderson doctrine, because in that case,
there was no deposit of any foreign substance on the land of the
plaintiff, which deprived her of its use. Beaver, J., remarks
that the Sanderson case "is exceptional and rests entirely upon its
own facts." Every case we suppose rests entirely on its own
facts. On whose facts could it rest; if it rests at all? To say
that the case is exceptional may mean that actual cases of the
same sort are few in number, and the occasions for applying its
2'7113 Pa., 149.
28221 Pa., 298, affirming 33 Super., 151.

2932 Super., 283.
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principle are therefore infrequent. The relevancy of the princi80
The defendant
ple was denied in Welliver v. Irondale, etc. Co.
made an artificial water course on his land, for the purpose of
supplying power for the manufacture of electricity, whichwasfurnished to a borough for lighting. The action was to recover damages for injury to the plaintiff's land, caused by seepage and percolation of water through the embankment of the race.Thewater
was artificially brought on defendant's premises. It was his
duty to employ care in order to prevent its escape. A like refusal to concede the pertinence of the Sanderson doctrine, appears in Sullivan v. Steel Co. 31 . A blast furnace used "Mesaba"
iron ore from which a prodigious amount of dust was carried
upon houses and lands in the neighborhood. This or.e was artificially brought to the furnace. In the Sanderson case nothing
was brought on the land artificially. Hence, the further injury
by the dust was enjoined.
McCUNE v. PITTSBURG, ETC. CO.
In McCune v. Pittsburg, etc. Co. 32 the court did not give
damages, for injury to a stream of water flowing over the plaintiff's land by pumping mine water into it, but enjoined the continuance of the injury. Doty, J., states (1) a prima facie case for
the plaintiff would have been made out by showing that a stream
of pure water flowing through his lands, was polluted by the action of the defendant, in pumping mine water from a lower level.
(2) The burden would then be on the defendant to show that
carrying on mining made such injury unavoidable, even
by reasonable care and expenditure. Here there could apparently
have been adopted a drainage which would have avoided the
injury and there was no attempt to show that this drainage
would have been ineffectual, or unreasonably expensive.
AN EXTENSION OF THE PRINCIPLE
An action was brought against a coal company for the injury
to the plaintiff's land by the settling over and upon it of coal
3038 Super.. 26.
31208 Pa., 540.
32238 Pa., 83.
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The defendant contended
dust from a neighboring breaker. 3
Sanderson case, damnum
the
to
that the injury, was, according
absque injuria. The court concedes that it had a right to mine
coal. It had an equal right to break the coal into marketable
sizes. As it could mine although the unavoidable effect was to
pollute streams of water, and thus deprive riparian owners of the
pureness and usableness of the water, so it could crush the coal,
although in so doing dust was formed which would be swept by
the w*ind over the lands of others, provided that it properly
used the most effective and approved known appliances to control the dust. In order that there should be liability, it was necessary that the defendant should negligently omit to use available
and practicable precautions against the diffusion of the dust, and
the injury to the plaintiff must be more than "trifling;" must be
"substantial." If no lack of care is imputable to the company,
any injury, great or small, resulting from the operation of the
breaker, is damnum absque injuria. The position of the defendant, apparently, differed from that of the court herein, that the
former contended for immunity from liability irrespective of
care to avoid the injury and the latter conceded it, only when
such care appeared. The reference to 113 Pa., 126, in the beginning of the opinion is somewhat mystifying.
PUBLIC RIGHTS
The intimation is made, by Clark, J., that the pollution of a
stream, by mining, might so affect "the general health and well
being of the community," as to justify and require the suppression of the acts which corrupt the stream, even although such
suppression would involve the cessation of mining operations.
The justice refers to the fact that the city of Scranton, and Mrs.
Sanderson are supplied with pure water from other sources. The
pollution of Meadow Creek is not averred to affect the general
35
health.3 4 It is accordingly held, apparently, that a water com33

Harvey v. Coal Co., 201 Pa., 63.

34

Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa., 126, 149.

35

Com. v. Russell, 172 Pa., 506.
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pany, organized to furnish water to a borough, may enjoin the
pumping of salt water, in the process of extracting oil, into the
creek from which the water is obtained.
CARLISLE, PA.

August 31st, 1913
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MOOT COURT
JONES v. BOROUGH
Playing Base-Ball on Streets-Liability of Borough
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For years boys had played baseball on the streets of the borough
without interference by the authorities, altho frequent complaints had
been made to the latter. While John Jones was walking on the street,
a ball struck him, from the effect of which he died. This is an action
by his widow against the borough.
Fry for the plaintiff.
Martin for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FINE, J. The only question in this case that need occupy the attention of this court is, whether the accident, which resulted in the death
of the husband of the plaintiff, was due to negligence in the exercise of
the police power, or in the exercise of the borough's "housecleaning"
powers (powers to keep the streets, etc., in-good condition and free from
obstructions).
If the negligence was due or fell under the former power, the plaintiff's case must of necessity fall; if under the latter power, the plaintiff
has a very good peg upon which to hang her claim for damages.
Now, we must consider what powers, or what scope of things,
this police power comprehends. In 8 Cyc. 863 police power is defined to
be the "name given to that inherent sovereignty which it is the right and
the duty of the government or its agents to exercise whenever public
policy in a broad sense demands, for the benefit of the society at large,
regulations to guard its morals safety, health, order, or to insure in any
respect economic conditions as an advancing civilization of highly complex character requires." It is further held that the legislature cannot,
by any contract, divest itself of any police power, the maxim salus populi
suprema lex necessarily applying. 8 Cyc. 865. It is plainly discernible
then that the police power is lodged in the State and not in the municipal corporation.
Under the "housecleaning" powers of the borough, such corporation
has the right to care for its streets; to see that they are free from obstruction; to build parks, etc.; and to maintain highways, sewers, and
whatever. Borough of Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa., 191. Such
power is conferred by court or by statute.
This court fails to see how the plaintiff can hold the defendant
borough liable under the latter power, for under the former power she
certainly has no redress against the borough and it is only under latter power she can be held if held at all.
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When it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the
acts of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is whether they are servants or agents of a corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects
them; can control them in the discharge of their duties; can hold them
responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust; and if
those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers and are for the
peculiar benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest,-they
may justly be regarded as the agents or servants and the maxim of respondeat superior applies. But if, on the other hand, they are elected
or appointed by the corporation in obedience to the statute, to perform
a public service not peculiarly local or corporate but because this mode
of selection has been deemed expedient by the legislature in distribution
of the powers of government; if they are independent of the corporation
as to the tenure of their office and the manner of discharging their duties,-they are not to be regarded as the servants or agents of the corporation, for whose acts or negligence it is impliedly liable, but as public
or state officers with such powers and duties as the statute confers upon
them, and the doctrine bf respondeat superior is not applicable. 2 L. R. A.
147, case note.
The police department of a municipal corporation derives its authority from the State and when such corporation is not expressly or by
necessary implication authorized to do so, it can neither enlarge nor
restrict duties of such department or its officers or agents, as defined by
general assembly. Cleveland v. Payne, 72 Ohio St. 347, 74 N. E. 177.
Surely, the negligence complained of in this case falls under the
police power, for it is neglect of the officers of the borough police department to stop the boys from playing baseball, that is alleged as the cause
of the death. From what has been said heretofore, the plaintiff consequently has no case. However it might be advisable to cite a few more
authorities which uphold our contention.
In the Borough of Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121, it was held
that the police officers cannot be regarded as servants or agents of the
borough. Their duties are of a public nature and their appointment
is devolved on borough as convenient mode of exercising public function, but this does not render them liable for their unlawful or negligent
acts. Conservation of the peace is a public duty, put by the commonwealth into the hands of various public officers. Hand v. Phila., 8
C. C. R. 213; Butterick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen (Mass.) 172; Elliot v.
City of Phila., 75 Pa. 347, also uphold this doctrine. Cases somewhat
similar may be found in Grant v. City of Erie, 69 Pa. 420; Carr v. N.
Liberties, 11 Casey 324.
The chief burgess has the powers of a justice of the peace for the
suppression of riots, tumults, and disorderly meetings. It is his duty
to preserve order and maintain the peace. It does not follow, however,
that borough is not liable for the non-feasance and misfeasance of its
peace officers. Neither neglect of the policemen to enforce ordinances
against coasting, resulting in the throwing down of a pedestrian by sled,
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nor the failure of the borough to adopt an ordinance against coasting,
would make borough actionable for consequent injury. Conservation
of the peace is a great state duty and the borough in appointing police
officers simply acts in aid of the state. Indeed, liability of a municipality for acts of its agents is confined in main, to cases of public works
carried on under its direction and superintendence and to cases relating
to construction and keeping in repairs of public highways. Trickett on
Penna. Boro. Law, Vol. 1, pages 271-273.
It was held in Knight v. Phila., 15 W. N. C. 307, that a city was
not liable for negligence of an employee of a fire department.
A very broad statement of the rule is laid down in Shepherd v.
Inhabitants of Chelsea, 4 Allen (Mass.) 113, and Rowell v. Lowell, 7
Gray (Mass.) 100, which is as follows: "A city is not liable for injury caused by the combined effects of the unsafe condition of the highway and the unlawful or careless act of a third person, whereby the
plaintiff was injured.
Upon the authorities above cited, we are urged to decide for the
defendant, as the court can see no possible reason for taking this case
from under the police powers of the state, when in similar cases for injuries caused by coasting down hills and by drunken men falling about
the streets, the court held that such accidents were under the police
power and no recover could be had against the municipality. Surely
there is as much of an obstruction of the streets in one case as in the
other. Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
It is the duty of a borough, having laid out and opened, a street,
to keep it in repair; a duty owed toward each of those who use it. If
one of these suffers injury from the omission of the borough to perform
this duty, it is bound to indemnify him.
A street may become unsafe for passengers, not merely by structural
defects, but by the acts of individuals, as in making holes in it, putting
ropes, wires, fences, across it, allowing a dead horse to remain upon it,
Fritsch v. Allegheny, 8 W. N. C. 318, and for not effacing the effects of
these acts of individuals, within a reasonable time, the borough becomes
liable to such persons as are injured in consequence.
But, the use of a street may be rendered unsafe by the transitory
acts of individuals; e. g., by cycling on the foot-walks, by firing off a cannon; by "coasting;" by "sledding;" by playing base-ball.
To prevent these acts would require the issue of a prohibition, in
the form of an ordinance, and the enforcement of the ordinance. The
question with which we must here deal, is must the borough exercise
its preventive power, in order to avert the doing of these acts, by the
enactment and execution of the appropriate ordinance?
In a majority of cases that havebeen considered, it is held that the
municipality is not bound towards individuals to enact or enforce ordinances of this kind; e. g., such as prohibit sledding, Dudley v. City
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of Flemingsburg, 115 Ky. 5; 1 Am. & Eng. Ann. C. 958; bicycling on the
sidewalks; Jones v. Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722; the firing of cannon,
Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121.
The possession of the power to prohibit the running at large of
dogs, does not make a borough or city liable to one whose child has
died from rabies communicated to it by the bite of a mad dog. Smith
v. Selinsgrove Borough, 199 Pa. 615. The putting of lights on a street,
facilitates their use with safety by passengers, and the municipality
has the power to place such lights on the street. Its omission to do
so does not however, make it liable to one who has suffered an accident in colliding with a fire plug, with which sufficient light would have
prevented a collision. Horner v. Philadelphia, 194 Pa. 542.
In Goodwin v. Town of Reidsville, (N. C.) 76 S. E. 232, the exact
question presented in the case before us was considered. "The evidence
tends" says Brown, J., the writer of the opinions "to prove that certain
boys had a custom of collecting on the streets and playing ball in the
evenings, frequently during the spring and summer months, which custom had been going on for over two years, and was known to the police
officers of the town, and no effort had been made to stop it." Goodwin,
while driving along the street was struck with a ball and injured so
seriously that he died. It was held that there was no liability.
In following this decision, and affirming the judgment below, we do
not desire to express approval of the decision and the logic that has conducted the courts to similar decisions in like cases. To say it is the
duty of a municipality to keep obstacles to travel and to the safety of travel
from streets, such as dead animals, ropes, wires, fences, but not to keep
people by preventive ordinances, from themselves, by their presence, in
large numbers, or by their acts, such as sledding, skating, playing baseball,'cycling, impeding travel or rendering it unsafe appears an arbitrary
and futile distinction. To say that it would be unreasonable to hold a
borough liable for not doing an act which it had not the power to do,
is to say nothing of value. The power may be inferred from the duty.
Much of the recognized power of boroughs and cities, has been created
not by statute, but by judicial concession. We think it would be wise
to hold that there is a power in a borough to prohibit whatever renders
the use of its streets inconvenient or unsafe, and that, when the circumstances clearly indicate that this power should be exerted, the failure to
exert it should, as negligence, expose the borough to a liability to indemnify those who suffer therefrom.
The playing of base-ball on a street is manifestly dangerous. Travelers should not be compelled, either to renounce their travel, or to
take grave risks improperly imposed, and the borough is the most convenient instrument for defining the uses of streets which ought not to be
made and for securing abstinence from such uses.
Affirmed.
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COMMONWEALTH v. HUDSON
Challenge of Jurors
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trial for murder. Several jurors when called upon were asked by
the Commonwealth whether they would in the making of the verdict,
express their own judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and not unite in a verdict to which their minds did not assent simply
because a majority of the jurors agreed on it and it was desirable that
an agreement on a verdict should be reached. The defendant excepted
to the questions and the trial court rejected them. Hudson convicted
appeals.
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
INGRAM, J. The question in this case was put by the plaintiff
and the defendant objected to it and his objection was sustained. However the defendant asked for a new trial and upon its refusal he appealed
the case. Since the objection to the question was sustained and the defendant appealed, it is evident that he thought the mere stating of the
question was detrimental to his cause. Reason tells us that a defendant in a cause desires that the jurors shall not agree and thus not be
able to render a verdict. In this case the contention of the defendant
must be that the question as put by the Commonwealth tended to influence the jurors to reach a verdict by the fact that a majority opinion
had been reached and the others should agree making it an unanimous
decision, thus giving a verdict.
As we understand the case then we come to the conclusion that
the contention of the defendant is that the jurors should not be influenced
in their decision by the fact that the majority of the jury have come to
the same conclusion. Logically then the contention of the plaintiff
should be that the jurors should be influenced by the fact that a majority have come to the conclusion. After duly considering the question
we sustain contention of defendant.
A verdict is the unanimous decision of a jury and to form a verdict of conviction the jurors must each and every one concur to the guilt
of the accused. 34 Ohio State 228.
In all criminal proceedings the accused shall have the right to a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury. 24 Cyc. 290. Asking improper questions to jurors tend to influence their decisions and thus
render jury partial.
The defendant has a right not only to see and know that the whole
jury is present assenting to the verdict but also by polling to demand
face to face of each juror whether the verdict is his own verdict rendered
according to his conscience or not. Temple v. Comm., 14 Bush 762.
Sadler's Criminal Procedure, page 397 states the inquiries on a
voir dire must tend to show that ground for challenge for cause exists,
and under such an examination it says that it is not proper to ask if any
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impression has been formed as to the guilt or innocence, since only a
fixed opinion would disqualify; also says it is improper if juror states
that he has reached an opinion, to ask him what it is.
Comm. v. Van Horn, 188 Pa. 144 holds it is improper to ask a
juror on his voir dire what he would do upon the whole of the testimony
in a certain event or what his opinion would be as to the guilt of the
defendant though the law presumed him innocent until proved guilty.
In 12 Cyc. 721, and in case of Cooper v. State, 103 Ga., it is stated
"a new trial will be granted where it appears that communication, between
the officers and jurors, of a character calculated to prejudice to the accused takes place."
It is the duty of a juror to weigh the evidence and other material
facts of the case and render an impartial verdict and we think that giving a verdict merely because the majority have agreed on a verdict and
to come to a conclusion is in no sense the duty of juror.
We think it reasonable to say that a majority rule verdict is bad.
Such a verdict would be against public policy and sound legal principles,
as making life depends upon an uncertainty.
Appeal sustained and v. f. d. n. awarded.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The accused is entitled to exemption from punishment unless twelve
men really agree in believing, in having, indeed, no reasonable doubt
of, his guilt. That there is a tendency in some minds to yield to the
authority of others; that from mental indolence, or fear of seeming obstinate and opinionated, some minds are disposed to acquiesce in the
decisions of others, are facts too well known to need evidence. If then,
a man on trial has a right to the judgment of twelve men, who will be
honest and capable, that he has a right to test the candidates for the jury,
in order to discover whether they possess these qualities, would seem to
be a truism. The precise question before us, however, has been considered by the Supreme Court of Ohio. That court decides that it is
error to allow the defendant to ask a juror whether he would stand by
the opinion he should reach, after weighing all the evidence, and the
arguments of counsel, and the discussions of his fellow jurors. Says
O'Hara, J., "It is not proper however to submit hypothetical questions
to the jurors in an effort to learn in advance what they will do in a
supposed state of the evidence or on a supposed state of facts, and thus
possibly commit them to certain ideas or views, when the case shall be
finally submitted to them for their decision."
The object of all investigation into the proposed jurors is to learn
something in "advance." It would surely be useless to learn their fitness
or unfitness, after they had rendered their verdict.
There are certain views of duty, certain biases, or prejudices, certain fixed opinions, which prognosticate a failure of the juror's duty,
and which should therefore be known to the parties to be affected by
their decision. The juror may be asked whether he has, and he may be
rejected if he says he has, a scruple against capital punishment. Comm.
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v. Valsalka, 181 Pa. 17; Comm. v. Lesher, 17 S. & R. 155. The court
properly rejects a juror who says that he has a repugnance to convicting
and therefore could not, would not, convict on circumstantial evidence.
Comm. v. Heist, 14 C. C. 239. It has even been held that a juror is
properly rejected who says, on the voir dire, that he thinks insane any
who would commit such an offense as the one for which the defendant
is being tried, and that it would require evidence to change that opinion.
Comm. v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535.
There are other decisions which it is difficult to harmonize with
these. It was said to be proper to exclude a question designed to elicit
a statement as to the effect on the juror's tendency to convict the defendant of murdering a woman with whom he illicitly cohabited, of the
fact of such cohabitation. Comm. v. Van Horn, 188 Pa. 143. "As the
inquiries" says Green, J., "simply related to the possible action of the
juror upon hypothetical conditions, it is manifest that they should have
been rejected." Yet, it is often allowed to question a juror as to his
capacity to render a verdict upon evidence to be submitted, that would
not be controlled by his present opinion concerning the guilt of the accused. Sadler Crim. Procedure, 398.
It is the duty of jurors not to unite in a verdict simply because a
majority of jurors are ready to make it, or for the purpose of hastening the liberation of the jurors from an unpleasant confinement. We
see no solid reason for refusing the opportunity to question the juror
as to his fitness, or willingness to discharge this duty. The statements
of Justice O'Hara seems wanting in substance. The questions concerning future behavior are always hypothetical. We see in the question proposed no effort to commit the juror in advance to certain ideas or
views, to which he should not be committed, viz. that of voting, in the
consultations, his own, and not his fellow-juror's opinion. To assert
that one juror may properly vote, not his own view, but that of his fellows, is to deny to the defendant the right to be exempt from penalty
until twelve men think, not say,-that he is guilty.
If a juror cannot know whether his verdict will express his own opinion, or that of other jurors, surely he is unfit to be a juror. We agree
therefore with the decision of the learned court below.
Affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v. HONSON
Insurance Against Liability for Negligence.

Automobile

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Honson while negligently operating his automobile greatly injured
X, a pedestrian on the street who subsequently recovered $5000 damages
from Honson. The defendant had insured Honson against all liability

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
arising from the operation of the auto for three years.

This is an action on the policy for indemnity. Defense is that the
insurance is against public policy as tending to lessen care of those who
operate automobiles.
Bender for defendant.

Carroll for plaintiff.
OPINION
MOROSINI, J. The question in this case is whether this contract
is void as being against public policy.
We shall now consider the defense contended for by the defendant.
A contract of indemnity, the manifest object or tendency of which is the
compounding of.an indictable offense is illegal and void. 22 Cyc. 83. This
contract in question has no such illegal purpose for its consideration as
there is no particular illegal act contracted for. In construing a contract of indemnity no presumption will be raised that it is against public policy. 22 Cyc. 84.
In case in 97 Mass. 482, a contract had been made by the owner of
a vessel to indemnify the master of the ship from all expenses which
might arise from the chastisement of the crew. This contract was construed as a contract for legal expenses which he might incur in groundless suits and prosecutions against him. Therefore by following the rule
of construction laid down in the above case, we must construe this contract in favor of the plaintiff and hold it as a valid contract and not as
one against public policy. The defense is raised that such insurance
would tend to lessen the care of those driving automobiles and for that
reason is against public policy. But there are fire insurance policies
which allow recovery even though the building was burned by the policy holder's own negligence. There are also life insurance policies
allowing recovery even though the insured was killed by his own negligence. Do these policies not tend to lessen the care which the insured
would ordinarily exercise and therefore are they not against public policy? Are they not then void? But we have seen that such policies
have been enforced time and time again and are always upheld by our
courts as legal and binding.
Then there is another form of insurance known as the employers'
liability insurance which is an insurance which provides indemnity to
employers against liability for accidents to their employees. There are
also railroad liability policies in which the railroad company is indemnified against liability'incurred on account of injuries inflicted to persons
riding on its road or employed by them.
It will be seen that these contracts are of the same type as the one
in question and yet they are in general use and are upheld as valid
contracts.
In the case in 38 L. R. A. 97 cited in Cyc. 1036, note 5, it was held
a policy indemnifying a common carrier against liability for injuries
to passengers and employers is not void as being in contravention of
public policy.
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In the case in 158 Mass. 407, recovery was allowed on a policy insuring against accidental personal injuries to persons by the elevator of
the assured or its appurtenances and for which he should become liable.
Case in 155 Mass. 404, recovery was allowed on an insurance policy
insuring employer against claims for compensation for accidental personal injuries to others than employers caused by any horse, teams,
or vehicles owned by the assured if engaged in his business or in charge
of his employees.
11 American, 2 Eng. Cyc. of Law, 10, says on this subject "contracts
of insurance in this class have been assailed as being contrary to public
policy invirtually lessening the penalties which follow negligence on the
part of the assured toward those to whom he owes a legal duty. But
this view has not received judicial sanction." Therefore if insurance
can be had in cases as cited above and the contracts are enforced as
binding, why should recovery not be allowed in the case at hand? This
case is like those cited above in all respects and we think it should be
enforced as a legal and binding contract.
Verdict for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The only objection to a recovery by the plaintiff, made by the defendant, is, that the contract of the latter to indemnify him for a liability
under which he might fall, on account of his operation and his negligent
operation of the automobile, is contrary to public policy and void.
That, after a man is indemnified in advance, against the results of
his acts, even his negligent acts, he may be less likely to be careful,
can hardly be gainsaid. It should be the object of the law to encourage
people to be careful, with respect to acts which may affect the well-being
of other persons.
The court below, however, has adverted to instances in which this
object has not been allowed to prevent insurances of various sorts, against
acts which have been negligent. Said Gibson, C. J., in Amer. Ins. Co.
v. Insley, 7 Pa. 223, a marine insurance case, "public policy requires no
more than that a man be not suffered to insure against his own knavery,
which is not to be protected or encouraged by any means." Cf. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Transportation Co., 117 U. S., 312. Strong, J., observed
that a fire policy "is a protection against fire caused by the assured's own
negligence, unless the negligence amounts to fraud." Cumberland Valley Mut. Protection Co. v. Douglas, 58 Pa. 419. The lower court's instruction to the jury that "if it [the fire] was occasioned by ordinary
negligence, she [the plaintiff] may be entitled to recover in this case. If
it was occasioned by gross negligence, such as no person should be guilty
of, the misfortune is her own, and she cannot recover," resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, which the Supreme Court approved.
Bentley v. Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 276. In Gould v. Brock, 221 Pa. 38, the validity of an insurance of an automobile-owner, against liability to others
for accidents, negligently caused, was assumed. It is unnecessary to
investigate the subject further, and the judgment of the learned court
below is affirmed.

